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Defining a Problem as Technical

Depoliticises Decisions

Defining a problem as technical conveniently hides the political choice and priorities involved and reduces the arguments to arguments over technical details. Government decisions are often defined as technical decisions and the issues at stake also as primarily technical. In this way, the decision appears to be subject to objective criteria that can be evaluated by the experts using economic and scientific models, calculations and statistics. Difficult issues such as conflicting interests do not have to be resolved and the alternatives can be compared solely on the basis of cost and effectiveness in solving the immediate problem.

Those who control 'certified expertise' hope that by defining the issue as non-political they can avoid being embroiled in a public debate. Proposals can be "thrust upon the public as if they were noncontroversial technical decisions" and without policy makers appearing to be arrogant or undemocratic in doing so without open debate. The justification of major policy decisions in terms of "some purportedly objective knowledge" is seen to be necessary in representative democracies. Unspoken objectives such as winning votes in marginal electorates or attracting industry to a particular region do not become explicit. Opposition can then be labelled emotional or politically biased, ignorant or irrational.

Expertise in ethics, morals and values is not generally recognised. These aspects of life are considered to be a matter of opinion and therefore ethical, social or political arguments are not so compelling as scientific or technical arguments. It has also been argued that by focusing increasingly on technical issues "we are diverted from more significant and fundamental issues and even start to lose our capacity to deal with them."

It is not to be assumed that experts are fooled by the pretence that a problem is totally technical. Most engineers are fully aware of the political dimensions of the decisions they make and the advice they give but they cannot make those political dimensions obvious for fear of undermining the faith others have in expertise. They must appear to be apolitical for after all they are not elected and it is their perceived neutrality which allows them to have power. Guy Benveniste, in his book The Politics of Expertise, claims: "a principle function of the apolitical definition of the policy expert's role is the exact opposite of the definition: it provides access to social power without political election."

David Dickson also argued in The New Politics of Science that a move towards a greater role for science in regulation has been used as a way of hindering and manipulating regulation by demanding proof and certainty where scientific knowledge is partial, such as the effects of chemicals on human health, and by defending decisions on the grounds that they were dictated by science when in reality political factors influenced the decision.

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Decisions Become Expert Terrain

By keeping issues confined to technical discussion, not only do policy makers avoid making their objectives and priorities explicit but they ensure that any argument is confined to an arena in which experts have authority. If it is admitted that a decision has social and political dimensions then it is much more difficult to maintain that only scientists and technologists should discuss and influence it. Confining debate to technical issues enables policy makers to hire and employ experts to justify their decisions and in any dispute they have an advantage because of their superior access to experts and technical information.

By hiring their own experts opponents can either question the evidence put forward by government experts or point to evidence that has been ignored. Debate, however, tends to remain focussed on technical issues rather than the conflicts over values and priorities which are really at the heart of any disagreement. Dorothy Nelkin, who has written extensively about technological controversy, says:

power hinges on the ability to manipulate knowledge, to challenge the evidence presented to support particular policies, and technical expertise becomes a resource exploited by all parties to justify their political and economic views. In the process, political values and scientific facts become more difficult to distinguish.

Expertise is not equally available to all those who might wish to use it to support their case and so it becomes an "instrument of power and privilege". Modern environmentalists often hire their own experts these days but government authorities and large corporations are always able to hire more experts, more prestigious experts and to limit information about the proposed project to the opposition. Experts, especially engineers, have been reluctant to speak on behalf of those opposing government, not only because it would mean opposing other engineers and breaking solidarity but also because, in Australia, such a large proportion of engineers are dependent on the government for either direct employment, consultancy work or grants.

Organisations are able to consolidate a monopolistic position by either acquiring widespread external professional consensus on their proposals or by "creating a large integrated research team whose advice cannot easily be dismissed". When widespread consensus is not feasible, organisations can limit outside interference by resorting to secrecy (see for example chapter 7) or by not allowing the public enough time to study the huge amount of research data that it has produced before the decision is made.

This secrecy enables government authorities to have a better command of the facts and to appear far more knowledgeable to the public but also helps them to suppress embarrassing information and hide internal differences of opinion. It has been suggested that such confidentiality is necessary to protect those experts from outside pressure or retaliation, ensure that internal discussions are frank and open and keep commercial trade secrets or matters of personal privacy from public view. It does seem, however, that the greatest pressure on experts comes from within the organisation for which they work (see chapter 12).

Without key information opponents can be fairly effectively disabled. Engineers, by exchanging information informally with other engineers in other parts of the public service, are able to form an "informal professional network of information exchange" as a "defence against emerging pressure groups with few resources". It then becomes a simple matter to expose such groups as poorly informed.

Whilst confidentiality is maintained it is therefore fairly easy to create the image that policy decisions and technological proposals are the direct result of an objective analysis of the facts provided by the experts and any disagreement between the experts is kept hidden from the public. Moreover the policy maker remains free not to accept the experts' advice if that advice is not made publicly.

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Legitimating Decisions Already Made

Decision-makers can make use of the esteem given to expert knowledge and the status given to science in order to justify, legitimise and gain acceptance for their decisions and to give the impression that their decisions have a sound and certain basis. This does not necessarily mean that the technical considerations were foremost in making the decision. Rather "specialised knowledge merely becomes another weapon in the decision-maker's political arsenal" .

Often a decision about a proposal will precede the detailed investigations, feasibility studies and environmental impact asssessments which are supposed to be enquiring into that proposal and engineers may be required to prepare a case in favour of a particular project or to argue that it is safe and environmentally sound.

It is common for heads of organisations and their advisers to accept that their task is to authenticate or justify the policies previously chosen and to deny the validity of the arguments introduced in support of the alternative recommendations made by others.

Alternatively experts can be explicitly chosen to do a study because of the views they hold. In this way the experts are being true to themselves whilst also serving those who have hired them. Either way the experts are used to legitimate a decision that is made on poltical grounds. The experts are used as mouthpieces to advocate the decision, in the way a public relations person might be, but are far more effective because of the public respect which experts command.

Legitimation might merely involve invoking an authority as a substitute for evidence or informing the public that the policy maker has consulted eminent experts, even if in fact the experts did not whole-heartedly support the proposal but reported confidentially so no one knows the difference. Instances have been reported where officials have selectively published expert reports, have summarised expert reports in a misleading way, have lied about expert reports, have suppressed information available only to them or have manipulated their advisers to ensure a favourable report.

Investigations can be selective and damaging evidence be suppressed. Technical advice can be slanted by using different criteria for collecting data and interpretations. Studies based on diverse premises require different sampling techniques. Detailed studies can be done into areas where the advisers are confident no harmful impacts will be found whilst areas where major problems are likely can be glossed over. The distortions inherent in the resulting large volumes of data will not be visible to those who do not have the time, skill or inclination to examine the reports in detail.

Various ways of not being totally honest in the presentation of evidence can be used. This is because assessing the impact of technological projects must be done in the face of technical uncertainties, "the absence of conclusive data and the lack of an accepted theoretical framework from which to draw definitive quantitative conclusions". Given this atmosphere of uncertainty there is scope for various interpretations, predictions and conclusions to be drawn from available data.

An expert can put his/her case more strongly than can be supported by the evidence so that the results seem decisive when in fact they are uncertain. When uncertainties exist the degree to which a firm conclusion can be reached is debatable at the best of times but in advocating a particular proposal, experts tend to ignore the uncertainties or keep them from the public view.


Source: Sharon Beder, The New Engineer, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1998, chapter 10.

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