Defining a Problem as
Technical
Depoliticises
Decisions
Defining a problem as technical conveniently hides the
political choice and priorities involved and reduces the
arguments to arguments over technical details. Government
decisions are often defined as technical decisions and the
issues at stake also as primarily technical. In this way,
the decision appears to be subject to objective criteria
that can be evaluated by the experts using economic and
scientific models, calculations and statistics. Difficult
issues such as conflicting interests do not have to be
resolved and the alternatives can be compared solely on the
basis of cost and effectiveness in solving the immediate
problem.
Those who control 'certified expertise' hope that by
defining the issue as non-political they can avoid being
embroiled in a public debate. Proposals can be "thrust upon
the public as if they were noncontroversial technical
decisions" and without policy makers appearing to be
arrogant or undemocratic in doing so without open debate.
The justification of major policy decisions in terms of
"some purportedly objective knowledge" is seen to be
necessary in representative democracies. Unspoken objectives
such as winning votes in marginal electorates or attracting
industry to a particular region do not become explicit.
Opposition can then be labelled emotional or politically
biased, ignorant or irrational.
Expertise in ethics, morals and values is not generally
recognised. These aspects of life are considered to be a
matter of opinion and therefore ethical, social or political
arguments are not so compelling as scientific or technical
arguments. It has also been argued that by focusing
increasingly on technical issues "we are diverted from more
significant and fundamental issues and even start to lose
our capacity to deal with them."
It is not to be assumed that experts are fooled by the
pretence that a problem is totally technical. Most engineers
are fully aware of the political dimensions of the decisions
they make and the advice they give but they cannot make
those political dimensions obvious for fear of undermining
the faith others have in expertise. They must appear to be
apolitical for after all they are not elected and it is
their perceived neutrality which allows them to have power.
Guy Benveniste, in his book The Politics of
Expertise, claims: "a principle function of the
apolitical definition of the policy expert's role is the
exact opposite of the definition: it provides access to
social power without political election."
David Dickson also argued in The New Politics of Science
that a move towards a greater role for science in regulation
has been used as a way of hindering and manipulating
regulation by demanding proof and certainty where scientific
knowledge is partial, such as the effects of chemicals on
human health, and by defending decisions on the grounds that
they were dictated by science when in reality political
factors influenced the decision.
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Decisions Become
Expert Terrain
By keeping issues confined to technical discussion, not
only do policy makers avoid making their objectives and
priorities explicit but they ensure that any argument is
confined to an arena in which experts have authority. If it
is admitted that a decision has social and political
dimensions then it is much more difficult to maintain that
only scientists and technologists should discuss and
influence it. Confining debate to technical issues enables
policy makers to hire and employ experts to justify their
decisions and in any dispute they have an advantage because
of their superior access to experts and technical
information.
By hiring their own experts opponents can either question
the evidence put forward by government experts or point to
evidence that has been ignored. Debate, however, tends to
remain focussed on technical issues rather than the
conflicts over values and priorities which are really at the
heart of any disagreement. Dorothy Nelkin, who has written
extensively about technological controversy, says:
power hinges on the ability to manipulate knowledge, to
challenge the evidence presented to support particular
policies, and technical expertise becomes a resource
exploited by all parties to justify their political and
economic views. In the process, political values and
scientific facts become more difficult to distinguish.
Expertise is not equally available to all those who might
wish to use it to support their case and so it becomes an
"instrument of power and privilege". Modern
environmentalists often hire their own experts these days
but government authorities and large corporations are always
able to hire more experts, more prestigious experts and to
limit information about the proposed project to the
opposition. Experts, especially engineers, have been
reluctant to speak on behalf of those opposing government,
not only because it would mean opposing other engineers and
breaking solidarity but also because, in Australia, such a
large proportion of engineers are dependent on the
government for either direct employment, consultancy work or
grants.
Organisations are able to consolidate a monopolistic
position by either acquiring widespread external
professional consensus on their proposals or by "creating a
large integrated research team whose advice cannot easily be
dismissed". When widespread consensus is not feasible,
organisations can limit outside interference by resorting to
secrecy (see for example chapter 7) or by not allowing the
public enough time to study the huge amount of research data
that it has produced before the decision is made.
This secrecy enables government authorities to have a
better command of the facts and to appear far more
knowledgeable to the public but also helps them to suppress
embarrassing information and hide internal differences of
opinion. It has been suggested that such confidentiality is
necessary to protect those experts from outside pressure or
retaliation, ensure that internal discussions are frank and
open and keep commercial trade secrets or matters of
personal privacy from public view. It does seem, however,
that the greatest pressure on experts comes from within the
organisation for which they work (see chapter 12).
Without key information opponents can be fairly
effectively disabled. Engineers, by exchanging information
informally with other engineers in other parts of the public
service, are able to form an "informal professional network
of information exchange" as a "defence against emerging
pressure groups with few resources". It then becomes a
simple matter to expose such groups as poorly informed.
Whilst confidentiality is maintained it is therefore
fairly easy to create the image that policy decisions and
technological proposals are the direct result of an
objective analysis of the facts provided by the experts and
any disagreement between the experts is kept hidden from the
public. Moreover the policy maker remains free not to accept
the experts' advice if that advice is not made publicly.
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Legitimating
Decisions Already Made
Decision-makers can make use of the esteem given to
expert knowledge and the status given to science in order to
justify, legitimise and gain acceptance for their decisions
and to give the impression that their decisions have a sound
and certain basis. This does not necessarily mean that the
technical considerations were foremost in making the
decision. Rather "specialised knowledge merely becomes
another weapon in the decision-maker's political arsenal"
.
Often a decision about a proposal will precede the
detailed investigations, feasibility studies and
environmental impact asssessments which are supposed to be
enquiring into that proposal and engineers may be required
to prepare a case in favour of a particular project or to
argue that it is safe and environmentally sound.
It is common for heads of organisations and their
advisers to accept that their task is to authenticate or
justify the policies previously chosen and to deny the
validity of the arguments introduced in support of the
alternative recommendations made by others.
Alternatively experts can be explicitly chosen to do a
study because of the views they hold. In this way the
experts are being true to themselves whilst also serving
those who have hired them. Either way the experts are used
to legitimate a decision that is made on poltical grounds.
The experts are used as mouthpieces to advocate the
decision, in the way a public relations person might be, but
are far more effective because of the public respect which
experts command.
Legitimation might merely involve invoking an authority
as a substitute for evidence or informing the public that
the policy maker has consulted eminent experts, even if in
fact the experts did not whole-heartedly support the
proposal but reported confidentially so no one knows the
difference. Instances have been reported where officials
have selectively published expert reports, have summarised
expert reports in a misleading way, have lied about expert
reports, have suppressed information available only to them
or have manipulated their advisers to ensure a favourable
report.
Investigations can be selective and damaging evidence be
suppressed. Technical advice can be slanted by using
different criteria for collecting data and interpretations.
Studies based on diverse premises require different sampling
techniques. Detailed studies can be done into areas where
the advisers are confident no harmful impacts will be found
whilst areas where major problems are likely can be glossed
over. The distortions inherent in the resulting large
volumes of data will not be visible to those who do not have
the time, skill or inclination to examine the reports in
detail.
Various ways of not being totally honest in the
presentation of evidence can be used. This is because
assessing the impact of technological projects must be done
in the face of technical uncertainties, "the absence of
conclusive data and the lack of an accepted theoretical
framework from which to draw definitive quantitative
conclusions". Given this atmosphere of uncertainty there is
scope for various interpretations, predictions and
conclusions to be drawn from available data.
An expert can put his/her case more strongly than can be
supported by the evidence so that the results seem decisive
when in fact they are uncertain. When uncertainties exist
the degree to which a firm conclusion can be reached is
debatable at the best of times but in advocating a
particular proposal, experts tend to ignore the
uncertainties or keep them from the public view.
Source: Sharon Beder, The New Engineer, Macmillan,
Melbourne, 1998, chapter 10.
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