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         Defining a Problem as
         Technical
         
          Depoliticises
         Decisions 
         
         Defining a problem as technical conveniently hides the
         political choice and priorities involved and reduces the
         arguments to arguments over technical details. Government
         decisions are often defined as technical decisions and the
         issues at stake also as primarily technical. In this way,
         the decision appears to be subject to objective criteria
         that can be evaluated by the experts using economic and
         scientific models, calculations and statistics. Difficult
         issues such as conflicting interests do not have to be
         resolved and the alternatives can be compared solely on the
         basis of cost and effectiveness in solving the immediate
         problem. 
         
         Those who control 'certified expertise' hope that by
         defining the issue as non-political they can avoid being
         embroiled in a public debate. Proposals can be "thrust upon
         the public as if they were noncontroversial technical
         decisions" and without policy makers appearing to be
         arrogant or undemocratic in doing so without open debate.
         The justification of major policy decisions in terms of
         "some purportedly objective knowledge" is seen to be
         necessary in representative democracies. Unspoken objectives
         such as winning votes in marginal electorates or attracting
         industry to a particular region do not become explicit.
         Opposition can then be labelled emotional or politically
         biased, ignorant or irrational. 
         
         Expertise in ethics, morals and values is not generally
         recognised. These aspects of life are considered to be a
         matter of opinion and therefore ethical, social or political
         arguments are not so compelling as scientific or technical
         arguments. It has also been argued that by focusing
         increasingly on technical issues "we are diverted from more
         significant and fundamental issues and even start to lose
         our capacity to deal with them." 
         
         It is not to be assumed that experts are fooled by the
         pretence that a problem is totally technical. Most engineers
         are fully aware of the political dimensions of the decisions
         they make and the advice they give but they cannot make
         those political dimensions obvious for fear of undermining
         the faith others have in expertise. They must appear to be
         apolitical for after all they are not elected and it is
         their perceived neutrality which allows them to have power.
         Guy Benveniste, in his book The Politics of
         Expertise, claims: "a principle function of the
         apolitical definition of the policy expert's role is the
         exact opposite of the definition: it provides access to
         social power without political election." 
         
         David Dickson also argued in The New Politics of Science
         that a move towards a greater role for science in regulation
         has been used as a way of hindering and manipulating
         regulation by demanding proof and certainty where scientific
         knowledge is partial, such as the effects of chemicals on
         human health, and by defending decisions on the grounds that
         they were dictated by science when in reality political
         factors influenced the decision. 
         
         Back... 
         
         Decisions Become
         Expert Terrain 
         
         By keeping issues confined to technical discussion, not
         only do policy makers avoid making their objectives and
         priorities explicit but they ensure that any argument is
         confined to an arena in which experts have authority. If it
         is admitted that a decision has social and political
         dimensions then it is much more difficult to maintain that
         only scientists and technologists should discuss and
         influence it. Confining debate to technical issues enables
         policy makers to hire and employ experts to justify their
         decisions and in any dispute they have an advantage because
         of their superior access to experts and technical
         information. 
         
         By hiring their own experts opponents can either question
         the evidence put forward by government experts or point to
         evidence that has been ignored. Debate, however, tends to
         remain focussed on technical issues rather than the
         conflicts over values and priorities which are really at the
         heart of any disagreement. Dorothy Nelkin, who has written
         extensively about technological controversy, says: 
         
         power hinges on the ability to manipulate knowledge, to
         challenge the evidence presented to support particular
         policies, and technical expertise becomes a resource
         exploited by all parties to justify their political and
         economic views. In the process, political values and
         scientific facts become more difficult to distinguish. 
         
         Expertise is not equally available to all those who might
         wish to use it to support their case and so it becomes an
         "instrument of power and privilege". Modern
         environmentalists often hire their own experts these days
         but government authorities and large corporations are always
         able to hire more experts, more prestigious experts and to
         limit information about the proposed project to the
         opposition. Experts, especially engineers, have been
         reluctant to speak on behalf of those opposing government,
         not only because it would mean opposing other engineers and
         breaking solidarity but also because, in Australia, such a
         large proportion of engineers are dependent on the
         government for either direct employment, consultancy work or
         grants. 
         
         Organisations are able to consolidate a monopolistic
         position by either acquiring widespread external
         professional consensus on their proposals or by "creating a
         large integrated research team whose advice cannot easily be
         dismissed". When widespread consensus is not feasible,
         organisations can limit outside interference by resorting to
         secrecy (see for example chapter 7) or by not allowing the
         public enough time to study the huge amount of research data
         that it has produced before the decision is made. 
         
         This secrecy enables government authorities to have a
         better command of the facts and to appear far more
         knowledgeable to the public but also helps them to suppress
         embarrassing information and hide internal differences of
         opinion. It has been suggested that such confidentiality is
         necessary to protect those experts from outside pressure or
         retaliation, ensure that internal discussions are frank and
         open and keep commercial trade secrets or matters of
         personal privacy from public view. It does seem, however,
         that the greatest pressure on experts comes from within the
         organisation for which they work (see chapter 12). 
         
         Without key information opponents can be fairly
         effectively disabled. Engineers, by exchanging information
         informally with other engineers in other parts of the public
         service, are able to form an "informal professional network
         of information exchange" as a "defence against emerging
         pressure groups with few resources". It then becomes a
         simple matter to expose such groups as poorly informed. 
         
         Whilst confidentiality is maintained it is therefore
         fairly easy to create the image that policy decisions and
         technological proposals are the direct result of an
         objective analysis of the facts provided by the experts and
         any disagreement between the experts is kept hidden from the
         public. Moreover the policy maker remains free not to accept
         the experts' advice if that advice is not made publicly. 
         
         Back... 
         
         Legitimating
         Decisions Already Made 
         
         Decision-makers can make use of the esteem given to
         expert knowledge and the status given to science in order to
         justify, legitimise and gain acceptance for their decisions
         and to give the impression that their decisions have a sound
         and certain basis. This does not necessarily mean that the
         technical considerations were foremost in making the
         decision. Rather "specialised knowledge merely becomes
         another weapon in the decision-maker's political arsenal"
         . 
         
         Often a decision about a proposal will precede the
         detailed investigations, feasibility studies and
         environmental impact asssessments which are supposed to be
         enquiring into that proposal and engineers may be required
         to prepare a case in favour of a particular project or to
         argue that it is safe and environmentally sound. 
         
         It is common for heads of organisations and their
         advisers to accept that their task is to authenticate or
         justify the policies previously chosen and to deny the
         validity of the arguments introduced in support of the
         alternative recommendations made by others. 
         
         Alternatively experts can be explicitly chosen to do a
         study because of the views they hold. In this way the
         experts are being true to themselves whilst also serving
         those who have hired them. Either way the experts are used
         to legitimate a decision that is made on poltical grounds.
         The experts are used as mouthpieces to advocate the
         decision, in the way a public relations person might be, but
         are far more effective because of the public respect which
         experts command. 
         
         Legitimation might merely involve invoking an authority
         as a substitute for evidence or informing the public that
         the policy maker has consulted eminent experts, even if in
         fact the experts did not whole-heartedly support the
         proposal but reported confidentially so no one knows the
         difference. Instances have been reported where officials
         have selectively published expert reports, have summarised
         expert reports in a misleading way, have lied about expert
         reports, have suppressed information available only to them
         or have manipulated their advisers to ensure a favourable
         report. 
         
         Investigations can be selective and damaging evidence be
         suppressed. Technical advice can be slanted by using
         different criteria for collecting data and interpretations.
         Studies based on diverse premises require different sampling
         techniques. Detailed studies can be done into areas where
         the advisers are confident no harmful impacts will be found
         whilst areas where major problems are likely can be glossed
         over. The distortions inherent in the resulting large
         volumes of data will not be visible to those who do not have
         the time, skill or inclination to examine the reports in
         detail. 
         
         Various ways of not being totally honest in the
         presentation of evidence can be used. This is because
         assessing the impact of technological projects must be done
         in the face of technical uncertainties, "the absence of
         conclusive data and the lack of an accepted theoretical
         framework from which to draw definitive quantitative
         conclusions". Given this atmosphere of uncertainty there is
         scope for various interpretations, predictions and
         conclusions to be drawn from available data. 
         
         An expert can put his/her case more strongly than can be
         supported by the evidence so that the results seem decisive
         when in fact they are uncertain. When uncertainties exist
         the degree to which a firm conclusion can be reached is
         debatable at the best of times but in advocating a
         particular proposal, experts tend to ignore the
         uncertainties or keep them from the public view. 
         
         
         
           
         
         Source: Sharon Beder, The New Engineer, Macmillan,
         Melbourne, 1998, chapter 10.
         
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