Role of Modern Science in the Ecological Crisis

Vandana Shiva

Anticipating the future was never more needed in human history than it is today. Since the threat to survival was never before as global and as sevre. Yet anticipating the future was never more difficult than it is today, because the pace and patterns of transformation unfold more rapidly than they are understood. Man's contemporary power to change the world is unprecedented in history. Man's powerlessness to assess the impact of the change and to intervene in the forces of change is also unprecedented.

The dialectic of the power to transform and the incapacity to foresee the implicatlons of the transformatlon are symbolised dramatically. The dialectic is at play in every radical manipulation of man's environment by man. It is this problematique in the anticipation of the future that will be the focus here particularly on the future of ecosystems, because in the contemporary threat to ecosystems is located the threat to human survival.

Why are ecosystems threatened? I would like to argue that a major source of threat to ecosystems' integrity is the incapacity of modern man to percelve the ecological integrity of nature. The scientific capacity that has grown has been the knowledge of single functions of single elements. Emerging from this fragmented and reductionist science are destructive and disruptive technologies which can tear systems apart and lead to their irreversible breakdown.

The sciences of maintaining life by maintaining the integrity of ecosystems have been rendered irrational by the reductionist mind. In their place have grown the sciences of disruption and destruction. The power of prediction was considered a unique power enjoyed by scientific knowledge. Increasingly, the predictions of science are faisified by the patterns unfolding in nature, because science is increasingly working across and against the patterns of nature. It is increasingly becoming a tool that destroys the balance between the manifold parts of nature which maintain the integnty of life on the planet.

Scientific prediction as characteristic of reductionist sciences cannot therefore provide the tool for anticipating the future of ecosystems. Categories which make for a capacity to foresee ecological destruction must arise from cultures which have survived by acquirtng ecological knowledge of the pattern of the whole ecosystem and have skill in manipulating merely the parts, so that the whole is not destroyed. These categories have enabled these cultures to work with the processes of nature rather than against them.

It was not so long ago that most philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists, both Western and nonWestern, relegated all traditional thought to the realm of the supernatural, the mystical and irrational. Modern science, in contrast, was uniquely placed as natural, material, empirical, rational.

The models of modern science which encouraged such opposing charactertsations were derived less from familiarity with actual scientiflc practice in the natural sciences and more from familiarity with idealised versions of it which gave science a special epistemological status. Unlike traditional beliefs of the world, which were moderated by social constraints like myths and were unverfiable, modern scientific knowledge was thought to be determined by th natural and not the social world.

Scientists, in accordance with an abstract scientific method, were viewed as putting forward statements corresponding to the realities of a directly observable world. The theoretical concepts in their discourse were in principle seen as reducible to directlv veriflable observational claims. Of course, an elementary investigation into the nature of scientific theories showed that such a reductlon was not possible and, instead, it was pervaslve theoretical presuppositions which determined observation and facts.

Social control of science

Further, the lack of existence of a theoretically neutral observational vocabulary excluded the possibility of definite and conclusive verificationist model but from the commitment of a specialist community of scientists to presupposed metaphors and paradigms which determined the meaning of constituent terms, concepts and the status of observation and facts.

Meaning and validity were controlled by the social world of scientists and not by the natural world. These new accounts of modern sciences left no criteria to distinguish between the myths of traditional thought and metaphors of modern science, between supernatural entities presupposed by traditional communities and theoretical entities presupposed by modern scientists.

The best argument for the lack of such a distinction is Robin Honon's 'African Tradltlonal Thought and Western Science' . Consider the commonest case of the search for cause in traditional Africa - the diagnoses of disease. Through the length and breadth of the African continent, sick or afflicted people go to consult diviners as to the causes of their troubles. Usually, the answer they receive involves a god or other spiritual agency, and the remedy prescribed involves the propitiation or calling of this being. But this very seldom is the whole story. For the diviner who diagnoses the intervention of a spiritual agency is also expected to give some acceptable account of what moved the agency in question to intervene, and this account very commonly involves reference to some event in the world of visible, tangible happenings.

Thus if a divner diagnoses the action of witchcraft influence or lethal mdicine spirits, it is usual for him to add something about tne human hatreds, jealousies, and misdeeds, that have brought such agencles into play. Or, if he diagnoses the wrath of an ancestor, it is usual for him to polnt to the human breach of kinshlp morality whlch has called down this wrath.

The situation here is not very dlfferent from that in whlch a puzzled Amerlcan layman, seeing a large mushroom cloud on the horizon, consults a friend who happens to be a physlcist. The physlclst may refer him to theoretical entities. Why this cloud?': Well, a masslve fusion of hydrogen nuclei has just taken place....' Substitute 'disease' for 'mushroom cloud' and 'special anger' for 'massive fusion of hydrogen nuclel' and 'breach of kinship morality' for 'assemblage and dropping of a bomb', and we are back again with the diviner. In both cases reference to theological entities is used to link events in the vislble, tangible world (natural effects) to their antecedents in the same world (natural causes).

To say of the traditional African thinker that he is interested in supernatural rather than natural causes makes little more sense, therefore, than to say of the physicist that he is interested in nuclear rather than natural causes. Both are making the same use of theory to transcend the limited vision of natural causes provided by common sense.

Let us remind ourselves at this polnt that modern medical men, though long blinded to such things by the fantastic success of the germ theory of disease, are once more beginning to toy with the idea that disturbances in a person's social life can in fact contribute to a whole series of sicknesses, ranging from those commonly thought of as bodily.

Thus, awareness of and familiarity with the theorising and practice of both modern science and traditional thought forces a collapse in the distinction between the supernatural and natural, the irratlonal and rational, the social and the scientific. It removes modern science from its presumed privileged epistemological status, and elevates traditional thought to the status of ethno science, because it constitutes legitimate ways of knowing and because its claims are expressed in the everyday languages of the people and are influenced by the structures of their languages. To that extent they are particular to each society and its people.

However, though theoretical explanation in traditional thought is now recognised as being about the natural and not the supernatural domain, and is of the same epistemological status as explanation in modern scientific thought, its cognitive power is seen as inferior to that of the latter. Thus Horton speaks of the 'superior cognitive powers' of the modes of thought of the modern scientific culture which constitute forms of explanation, predlctlon and control of a power unrivalled in any time and place. Thls cognitive superiority in hls view arises from the 'openness' of modern scientific thinking and the 'closure' of tradltlonal belief. As he interprets it: 'In traditional cultures there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical levels, whereas in the scientifically oriented cultures, such an awareness is highly developed.'

Ethno science and modern science

There are a number of problems in holding on the one hand such a perspective on the cognitive superiority of modern science while conceding epistemological status to traditional and modern belief systems.

Firstly, as Kuhn has shown, scientists are not in practice typically and consistently aware of the existence of alternatlves in any case. Science is not nearly as open as has been popularly thought. Scientific inquiry does not range freely amongst boundless alternatives as the popular image suggests, but at any given time is constrained by the currently dominant paradigm. On the other hand, one knows so little about traditional beliefs especially in the diachronic perspective that claims about their stagnation, lack of creativity etc. can only be speculation. Thus one cannot legitimately talk of the 'open' and 'closed' predicament but merely of rapidly versus slowly changing belief systems.

Why should more change in thinking per se amount to more rational and cognitively superior theorising? The phliospher Karl Popper's falsificationism seems to identify the willingness to give up beliefs with the critical spirit and hence rapidly changing belief systems are viewed as evolving towards more rational and objective claims. However, this view of progress-through-revolution again faces problems. If, following Kuhn, scientific change is guided by social and political factors and not by purely logical and empirical criteria provided by an abstract scientific method, it becomes difficult to conceive how change in itself ensures progress.

In spite of all Horton's anti-positivism and Popper's anti-verificationism, both fall victim to the positivist model whlch presents natural sciences as developing in a relatively straight line, as 'errors' are eliminated and a growing number of 'truths' are discerned. It is not always the case merely that today's acceptable explanations are tomorrow's fictions; it often turns out that today's unacceptable explanations are tomorrow's facts. The example of the earlier rejection of psychosomatic theories of disease and their current acceptance is only one example. We also have a return to mixed cropping and organic-manure in agriculture. How is it more rational to first glve up a belief and then return to it?

Even in Popper's unworldly third world of ideas and knowledge, it is therefore not possible to defend the claim that the higher the turnover of beliefs, the more rational one's beliefs will be. In the real world, however, where ideas and beliefs act as guides to action, and play a transformative as well as an interpretive role, too rapid a change in belief systems at times becomes a sign of irrationality and irresponsibility rather than rationality and a critical spirit.

The most glaring example of such irrationality and irresponslbillty is the situation of contemporary ecological crises. While traditional belief systems did, in rare cases, lead to material transformation of the environment that led to ecological disasters, in most cases ethno-sciences have proved to be adequate in maintaining societies and nature. On the other hand, threatening the conditions of natural and human sustainment through human intervention seems to be the rule rather than the exception in modern scientific thought and the practice it gives rise to, especially in fields dealing with health, food-production and food consumption.

The new philosophies of science which have broken down the supernatural-natural divide and the society-science dualism, and their established epistemological equivalence between ethno science and modern science, have however created models which do not allow one to discuss the status of beliefs about nature in the materialist perspective of the ecological crises. Kuhn's conclusion about nature fitting into the inelastic boxes of paradigms leaves no room to introduce those material situations when nature boomerangs. His view thus leads to material vacuity. Knowledge about nature can be materially assessed only when the dualism separating thought from action and belief from practice is broken.

Thls materlalist criterion allows one to view belief systems as weak when the unanticipated and unpredicted change in the material environment is far more extensive and intensive than the predicted transformation. When antibiotics create super-infectlon and flood control measures accentuate floods and fertilizers rob soil of its fertility, the problem is not merely between use and misuse of technology. It is rooted in the very process of knowledge-creatlon in modern science, a process which is increaslngly turning out to be more preoccupled wlth the material problems created by intervention through scientific beliefs than material problems posed by nature itself.

The Natural-Unnatural Divide

The belief-action and theory-practice unity which provides the unit of assessment in a materialist epistemology can be interpreted at two different levels in modern science. At the first level, the activity or practice which involves material transformation can be restricted to the scientist's practice in his specialised environment of a laboratory. This level however does not create conditions in which ecological instabilities arising from mistaken beliefs about natural processes can be seen. For an ecological evaluation of the materialist adequacy of theories it therefore becomes essential to consider a more general level of practice in which the material transformatlon is in the wider natural setting and not in the manipulated setting of a laboratory.

Quite obviously, certain types of scientific theorising does not reach the second level of practice. Examples of this are theories in astrophysics or particle physics which, in their contemporary state, stop at the material transformation required to create an experimental sltuation and do not spill over into the larger environment. However, such theorising is uninteresting in the context of a comparison with ethno science and an evaluation in an ecological perspective, though for a dualist philosophy of science restricted to the analysis of ideas alone it is just these fields which are most interesting since they are the most advanced in the reductionist-positivist scheme of thought. For our task, the scientific theory and practice that is of relevance is the type that does not have ecological implications and involves scientific practice in a wider natural setting.

The sociological and cognitive differentiation and fragmentation of modern science leads to powerful claims within the experimental environment. However, when such claims are extended to nature they are found to be cognitively weak because there is a great materialist divide between the natural and the man-made or unnatural world. Modern scientists therefore are found to read books, meters, computer print-outs. They do not read nature. The ecologlcal impact of modem science is thus found to arise from its restricted context of discovery and its assumed validity in wider natural contexts. It is here too, that the ideology of modern science is rooted.

The rapid turnover of modern scientific belief Ii not always based on a more rational and critical spirit among sclentists as Popper or Horton would hold. It is often related to their natural inadequacy in handling the natural material world -an inadequacy indicated by growing ecological problems. At the same time the slow change in traditional belief systems could be a sign of the material adequacy of such beliefs rather than the 'closed' predicament of such societies. That such belief systems have allowed the means of survival to be maintained over centuries says something about their cognitive strength in knowing nature. Beliefs about nature therefore need to be evaluated on the grounds of practice in nature, not on the success of beliefs to create an artiricial environment.

The success of modern scientists has often been misleadingly linked to their offering solutions to more problems than ever before. However, it is rarely noticed that most of the problems modern science is occupied with are man-made and spin-offs of the transformative activity arising from prior beliefs. They are not problems given in nature. To assess the success of beliefs about the natural world it is thus not enough to see how many of these problems are solved, but how many of these problems were initially presented in nature. Creating a problem to then solve it can hardly be seen as providing better insights into how nature works.

The worship of change as intrinsically more rational needs a revision in the light of the ecological crises. The rejection of traditional belief systems as stagnant if not also superstitious and irrational cannot but threaten the only cognitive resource we have to maintain the conditions of survival. We know too little of how these belief systems got created; but it must have been a long process of evolution and selection to ensure such a delicate balance with nature while transforming it materially.

The rationality of such systems is worth investigating in accordance with new criteria of rationality because old criteria no longer prove to be adequate. These are not merely academic issues. They are related to our chances for survival and to efforts which create pressure to steer modern science away from its ecologically suicidal path. Marx's most quoted quote has somewhere been creatively updated: 'Scientists have only changed the world, the problem is to conserve it'. And in the task of conservation, modern science must turn to ethno science for guidance.

Reassessing ethno science

For those who have internalised linearity in history and nature, taking guidance from ethno science will look like 'going backwards'. For others, who see plurality as the stable order for natural ecosystems and human societies, being enlightened by ethno science will amount to returning to the appropriate path after having gone astray for a while on the reductionist road. Nature is after all diverse, and authentic knowledge of nature should account for this diversity. Ethno sciences are not less reliable because they are pluralistic, and reductionist science universalised does not provide a more reliable account of nature because it is singular objectivity cannot, after all, be equated with a singular inappropriate answer that destroys its very object.

Recent history has shown in certain areas of human activity that a return to ecological thought and action is possible and desirable. The primitive practice of breast-feeding had been discredited by the advertising and reductionist claims of the baby-food industry. The ecology of breast-feeding has, however, become appreciated once again, and the primitive practice is enlightened practice today. Chemicalisation of health care seemed to be the only way to develop in the reductionist paradigm.

Work in ethno-medicine is again bringing back wholesome drugs and treatment. Probably the most significant shift has been from the hazardous anti-diarrhoeals of a multinationai like Ciba-Geigy to the safe and diverse use of oral-rehydration treatment for diarrhoeals. Sustainable organic farming which created farmers of forty centuries is on its way back, in all the diversity and plurality of its traditional base. The eucalyptus monoculture is in disrepute and tree-worship is an enlightened practice again under the inspiration of the Chipko movement and its roots in India's ethno-forestry.

Each of these steps towards ecological thought and action has been posslble because contact was made wlth an ethno-scientific tradition. If the world is to be conserved for survival, the human potential for conservation must first be conserved. It is the only resource we have to foresee and forestall the destructlon of our ecosystems.

Civilisations that have survived wlthout denying others the right to survival have always been guided by sciences and technologies sensitive to nature and man. Contemporary development however leaves both nature and man out of the assessment. An acceleration of erosion of resources and poisoning of ecosystems are the inevitable outcome of scientific and technological change which has become an end in itself and is not guided by criteria of choice related to resources and needs. The values of Artha (resources) and Kama (needs) are no longer primary. And there is no place for Dharma, the stabiliser in the contemporary scheme of things.

The ecological consciousness of ancient civilisations is a timeless heritage which is essential for maintaining life-support systems. It can be rendered obsolete only at the cost of human survival itself. Gandhi captured thls when he stated that 'modern civilisation seeks to increase bodily comforts, and it fails miserably even in dolng so.... This civilisation is such that one has only to be patient and it will be self-destroyed. There is no end to the victims destroyed in the fire of (this) civilisation. Its deadly effect is that people come under its scorching flames believlng it to be all good.

It is a charge against India that her people are so uncivilised, ignorant and stolid, that it is not possible to induce them to adopt any changes. It is a charge really against our strength. What we have tested and found true on the anvll of experience, we dare not change. Many thrust their advice upon India, but she remains steady. This is her beauty. It is the sheet anchor of our hope.

The contemporary ecology movements are new attempts to establish that steadiness and stability is not stagnatlon, and balance wlth nature's essential ecologlcal processes is not technological backwardness but technological sophistication. At a time when a quarter or the world's population is threatened by starvation due to erosion of soil, water and genetic diversity of living resources, chasing the mirage of unending growth, by spreadlng of resource destructlve technologies, becomes a major source of genocide. The killing of people by the murder of nature is an invisible form of violence which is today the biggest threat to justice and peace. Claude Alvares has called it the Third World War: 'A war waged in peacetime, without compassion but involving the largest number of deaths and the largest number of soldiers without uniform'. Ecology movements are a non-violent response to this Third World War whlch threatens the suivival of humanity.

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