As was noted in the previous section, economists put great emphasis on individualism, and equate value to the total of what each individual is willing to pay. A separate notion of public interest is alien to them. For example, Lenihan and Fletcher state that:

The welfare of the society has meaning only as the summation of the welfare of its individual members. The criterion for evaluating collective action must accordingly be its implications for their welfare as individuals, and hence in the aggregate. (1979, p. 4)

Daly and Cobb point out that the reduction of human values to individualism and the world to one in which 'individuals all seek their own good and are indifferent to the success or failure of other individuals' is fundamental to economics but far from reality. They argue that human values come into being socially; it is our relationships with other people that determine how we think and feel our desires, fears and aspirations. 'The social character of human existence is primary. The classical homo economicus is a radical abstraction from social reality.' (1989, p. 159)

One of the problems with assigning a monetary value to something, say Daly and Cobb, is that there is a tendency for economists and others to treat it as if it behaves like money. 'Thus, if money flows in an isolated circle, then so do some commodities; if money balances can grow forever at compound interest, then so can real GNP, and so can pigs and cars and haircuts' (p. 37). The analogies take over in people's minds.

Some environmentalists are concerned that the takeover of the environmental debate by economic language will bring with it subtle changes to the way people think about the environment. It is difficult to use terms like natural capital, stock, resources and assets habitually without beginning to see the environment as a set of inputs and outputs of the economic system that are at times interchangeable with other types of capital and resources. The market analogy involves consumers and producers. Yet if artificial markets are created for the environment, so that it can be valued, vital questions are begged. Who are the consumers? Is consumption of the environment a desirable goal? (People who enjoy the environment do not consider themselves to be consuming it.) And who is the producer? Nature itself? Is Nature likely to alter supply to suit demand?

Even in the real market, where private goods are bought and sold, prices do not necessarily reflect values. A person's home will rise and drop in value according to the market; but that price will not have much to do with what the home is worth to the person who has been living there for thirty years, with all its personal comforts, memories and associations. However, the price will indicate the home's replacement value.

Winin Pereira and Jeremy Seabrook from the Centre for Holistic Studies in Bombay argue that there is a need to change the bottom line from one of profit and loss to one of planetary health. They say:

The search for a dynamic equilibrium, which is what true sustainability involves, is said to be 'nostalgic' and 'romantic'. But the real victims of nostalgia are those who want to rehabilitate the 'eternal laws' of laissez faire economics. The 'romantics' are those who believe that the market, with its unseen hand, can guide human destiny and satisfy all conceivable wants. (1989, pp. 24&endash;5)

The dilemma for economists who argue that rational people look after their own self-interests is that they are propagating a self-defeating paradox. The converse of their case is that people&emdash;including economists must be irrational if they portray themselves as working for the common good. And if the theories of these economists arise from their own self-interests, or their perceptions of their employers' or clients' interests, why should anyone think such theories will promote or lead to environmental protection?

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