Map
- Part 1
Map
- Part 2
In
1989, Australian government authorities decided to use Homebush
Bay as the site for a future Olympic Games. Even the chance of winning
an Olympic bid, however, could not justify spending the $190 million
that experts estimated it would cost to contain and treat the toxic
wastes buried there. The government therefore sought a cheaper,
more modest remediation strategy that could be carried out in time
for the 1993 Olympic bid (Whithers 1996, p. 135).
Authorities
considered various options for dealing with the wastes. One possibility
was to segregate and treat the wastes, but this would have been
difficult and expensive.
Another
possibility would have been to take a "bank vault" approachsealing
up and walling in the wastes. This approach would have entailed
tightly containing the contaminated soil with double liners beneath,
soil capping over the top, leachate drains, and gas collection and
treatment systems. This approach was tried for a badly contaminated
embankment where the Olympic swimming facility was to be built,
but the planners decided that it was too expensive to be used elsewhere
(Whithers 1996, pp. 135-9).
A
third, cheaper option was chosen for the rest of the site. It eliminated
the gas collection and treatment systems and the double liners.
This option meant that the wastes would continue to leak into underlying
groundwater. A consultant to the government explained the reasoning
behind this approach:
The
liability associated with deterioration and or failure of a "bank
vault" secure landfill remained constant with time, but its
probability of occurrence increased with time as the facility
aged. By contrast the leaky landfill would over time carry less
liability as the quality of leachate eventually improved. Therefore
it is an intrinsically more robust or resilient way of limiting
risks.(Whithers 1996, p. 139)
In
other words, the waste would be disposed of by letting it slowly
leak into the surrounding environment, rather than by alternative
means that carried the risk of a financial liability that might
be incurred by a possible sudden and more traceable major failure
in the future.
In
public discussions, however, these cost and liability issues were
not raised. Instead, the public was told that the leaky landfill
was the only feasible option, given the difficulty of treating the
diverse range of chemicals that were present on the site. The option
of a more secure "bank vault" landfill was not discussed
outside of consultants reports.
By
choosing the leaky landfill option, the planners were able to reduce
the cost of remediation of the Olympic site from $190 million to
$69 million, including landscaping and road base preparations. This
enabled most of the remediation to be completed by 1993, in time
for Sydney to win the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games.
Australian
guidelines are quite explicit about the publics right to know
and participate in decision-making about the clean-up of contaminated
sites (ANZEC 1992, pp. 7, 9). The remediation work at Homebush Bay,
however, was carried out without proper public consultation. The
governments reports on contamination at the site and the risks
associated with it have not been published. In their place are newsletters
and brochures produced for public relations purposes.
In
1992, when the remediation was already underway, a local environmental
group conducted a survey which found that seventy-one per cent of
the respondents felt that they were not getting enough information
to form an opinion about what was being done in the Homebush Bay
area. Roughly the same numberseventy-five per cent-said
they had not received enough information to satisfy them that the
area would be safe for people to live and work.
The
usual process in NSW for involving the public in such decisions
is through the public and advertised display of an environmental
impact statement (EIS), after which the public is able to make submissions.
The mandatory requirement for such an EIS to be prepared was removed
through the introduction of a new Regional Environmental Plan prepared
by the NSW Department of Planning (1991). It gave the NSW Minister
for Planning full authority to give consent for development of the
area earmarked for Olympic facilities and allowed development of
the contaminated land within the areaincluding landfilling,
removal and reworking of filled materialto occur without the
normal consultation process. The assistant director of planning
at the NSW Department of Planning said the former plan was "too
restrictive" because it caused delays in construction and prevented
earthmoving on site because of fears of contamination. This would
have hindered the construction of Olympic facilities.(North and
Cook 1993)
The
new Regional Environmental Plan angered some environmentalists.
According to Jeff Angel (1993), director of the Total Environment
Centre, the plan allowed the government to be "a law unto itself.
It is incredible that despite the concerns previously expressed
by environmentalists that Sydneys Green Olympic bid was all
hot air, the government still felt it necessary to issue the REP
in this form."
On
the day the bid was announced, the Regional Environment Plan came
into effect, giving the minister powers to approve any development
at Homebush Bay whether or not it was environmentally damaging.
The head of Greenpeace at the time, Lynette Thorstensen, told the
Herald that this was not a setback: "At this stage we
are much more interested in seeing the green development up and
running than having ourselves locked up in disputes about process."
(Quoted in Southam 1993)
The
urgency to get the Games ready without bothering about due process
is something that the Olympic authorities undoubtedly appreciated.
Public relations is a much simpler and more controllable process
than genuine public consultation.
In
the absence of true public participation, PR around the Homebush
Bay site focused on vacuous media stunts and photo opportunities.
A brochure by the Olympic Coordination Authority falsely described
the remediation of the site as "worlds best practice."
On
31 October 1998 the OCA also organized an "Olympic Neighbors
Day." Titled "The Big Clean-up," the event took area
residents on a tour of the nicely landscaped Olympic site, while
avoiding mention of the toxic wastes buried underneath the new lawns
and shrubbery that will be slowly contaminating these neighbours
groundwater for years to come.
The
"remediation" at the Olympic site is already being used as a model
for other contaminated sites. The greenwashing in this case suits
not only the Olympic organizers, but also manufacturers that generate
toxic wastes, those that bury them, and developers that seek to
profit from the land on which these toxic wastes have been buried.
The
landfills are not the only waste problem associated with the Olympic
site. In 1997 Luscombe made a submission to the government on its
plans to expand the Lidcombe Liquid Waste Plant (LWP). The plant
is located between the Olympic sporting facilities and the athletesÕ
village. Luscombe argued that the plant "should be phased out as
a matter of priority". Amongst the concerns he raised in his submission
were the "health and safety issues associated with the close proximity
(240 metres) of the LWP to existing or proposed residential areas
(eg. Newington/Olympic village)" and its "potential to contribute
significant adverse effects on the area during major public events
such as the Olympics". He also noted the "complaints from nearby
residents regarding noxious odours and VOC [volatile organochlorine]
emissions from the LWP". He claimed that "a facility that emits
toxic, carcinogenic, persistent and bioaccumulative compounds to
the environment, particularly within 250 metres of residential housing,
clearly contradicts all of the principles of sound urban planning
and environmental responsibility."
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References:
Angel,
Jeff, (1993) 'Sydney's Olympic bid fails key environmental test',
Media Release, 17 June.
ANZEC,
(1992) Australian and New Zealand Guidelines for the Assessment
and Management of Contaminated Sites, Australian and New Zealand
Environment and Conservation Council, National Health and Medical
Research Council, January, pp. 7, 9.
Department
of Planning (1991), Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No. 24 -
Homebush Bay Development Area (Amendment No. 1), 24 May.
Greens
In Lowe, (1992) 'Survey - Homebush Bay Development'.
North,
Sam and Danielle Cook, (1993) ''Immediate' benefits if Games come',
Sydney Morning Herald, 17 June.
Southam,
Kate, (1993) 'Homebush planning has greens concerned', Sydney
Morning Herald, 2 October.
Whithers,
N. J. (1996) 'Embracing Risk Management: The Homebush-Newington
Experience' in Olympic Co-ordination Authority, Homebush Bay
Ecological Studies 1993-1995, Volume 2, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood,
Vic, p. 135.
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