Public
relations firms often classify local residents, as they do environmentalists,
into various publics so that they can concentrate on those likely
to be persuaded of the benefits of the proposed project and marginalising
those who are likely to oppose it. Desmond Connor (1994) a Canadian
PR consultant advises against holding a public meeting early on
before the various publics can be approached separately. He says:
The proponent typically calls a public meeting in order
to explain the project to them, confident that their opposition
will then disappear. In fact, the public meeting usually crystallizes
a more informed, organized and articulate opposition and generates
widespread negative publicity for the proponent and the project.
Instead
he advises companies to identify "the latent and secondary beneficiaries
of the project (the five volt positive people, compared with the 220
volt negative opponents)." These are people who "stand to benefit
in small and indirect ways" from the project. These people should
be kept informed and involved in a "joint problem solving process.
As people work together, informed peer group pressure usually results
in workable compromise solutions - not ideal from anyone's point of
view, but acceptable to all or nearly all."
In
1989 an Australian Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste engaged
the public relations firm Community Projects Ltd to develop a community
consultation strategy to prepare the way for the establishment of
a high temperature incinerator in Australia to burn hazardous wastes.
Several attempts had already been made to site an incinerator for
hazardous wastes but none has been successful, usually because of
the strength of local opposition to the facility. (Beder 1990)
The
Taskforce attempted, with the help of Community Projects Ltd, to
get broad 'in principle' acceptance for the high temperature incinerator
before a location for it was chosen. This was supposed to ensure
a detached, 'rational' debate took place before the emotions of
concerned local residents clouded the issue and before the community
living near the proposed incinerator site could muster support from
the broader community. Environmental groups were approached to procure
their commitment to the project before they could be approached
and influenced by a stricken community once the site was chosen.
Some environmental groups supported the incinerator while others
opposed it.
The
consultation process did not seek to find out what the community
wanted done with hazardous wastes. That was decided even before
the Taskforce was appointed. It's aim was to win acceptance for
a high temperature incinerator. The Taskforce and their PR consultants
sought to "achieve active public recognition that the proposal is
in the public interest." (Joint Taskforce on Intractable Waste 1989,
p2/13) Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak (1997), found this was
a typical approach after studying various technological controversies:
Mechanisms for public involvement may increase direct
public influence on the formation of policy, or may merely inform
policy makers about public concerns. More often they are a means
to manipulate public opinion, to win acceptance of decisions already
made, and to facilitate the implementation of these decisions.(p.
334)
The Taskforce, like others involved in such siting controversies,
assumed that most opposition "is based upon ignorance that can be
overcome" if the appropriate information is supplied. It therefore
supplied reassuring information to the groups whose support it sought.
However, the most fervent opponents to the incinerator were among
the best informed on the issue, a point the Taskforce admitted in
one of its reports when it observed that supporters or potential
supporters "tend to be less well-informed on the issues involved
than are the opponents." (p. 2/19)
The
Task Force was advised not to waste its persuasive efforts on that
part of the environment movement opposed to the incinerator because
they were unlikely to change their position. Community Projects
interviewed opposition groups in order to distinguish "opposition
likely to thwart a desired outcome ('effect') from that which is
likely to be ineffective even if it is discomforting ('noise')."
(pp. 2/17-19) The reason for needing to do this was that the Taskforce
wanted to manage and control the debate or, as it put it, "limit
destructive conflict". It
stated:
Unstructured public involvement is likely to be chaotic
and potentially destructive to a proposal. In the absence of a structure
for public involvement, individuals and groups will create their
own mechanisms... By providing a framework for public involvement,
the form and direction of this involvement can be managed in the
public interest. Under these circumstances public involvement in
the development of a proposal is more likely to be productive and
creative, and the scope for destructive conflict is significantly
reduced... (p. 2/13)
Of
course the terms 'productive' and 'creative' and 'destructive' are
all defined in terms of achieving the goal of establishing a hazardous
waste facility.
Allies
from within the environment movement were enlisted to help get the
incinerator accepted in Australia. Remaining opponents were categorised
and dismissed as either ignorant, having vested interests, or, in
the case of those stubborn yet well informed, environmentalists
who could not be co-opted, the Taskforce stated that they showed
"clear signs of wishing to assume the role of champions"(p. 2/20)
The use of the term 'champions' was a way of implying that opponents
are not concerned about the public interest. The Taskforce stated:
Champions are those who see some benefits for themselves
in adopting one position or another in a potential conflict. They
are sometimes more concerned with the opportunity to enhance their
reputation than with the details of the case. (p. 2/15)
The
Taskforce was unsuccessful in its efforts and to date no hazardous
waste incinerator has been established in Australia. Instead various
parts of the waste stream are to be treated with more specific technologies,
some currently being developed for the purpose.
Often
a public consultation exercise is little more than a public relations
exercise, undertaken for the primary purpose of winning public accceptance
for an unwanted facility. The process of consultation provides an
opportunity for the developer to show a caring, open approach and
to cultivate trust in the face of community concerns. Yet more often
than not corporations (and governments) are unwilling to reduce
or eliminate the hazards that give rise to those concerns and their
public relations advisers help them to mould and manage public opinion
instead of responding to it.
Public
relations shapes the interaction between corporations and their
'publics' in a way that is designed to mould public opinion and
win acceptance of corporate goals and ideologies. Yet that influence
only works while it is hidden. The exposure of public relations
strategies and messages and their source undermines their strength
and persuasive power.
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References:
Beder,
Sharon, (1990) 'No Smoke Without Fire', Australian Society,
July: 5-6.
Connor,
Desmond M., (1994) 'Preventing and Resolving Public Controversy',
Victoria, BC, Canada: Connor Development Services.
Joint
Taskforce on Intractable Waste, (1989) Phase 2 Report.
Nelkin,
Dorothy, and Michael Pollak, (1977) 'The Politics of Participation
and the Nuclear Debate in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria',
Public Policy, vol. 25, no. 3: 333-357.
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